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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
Two Jinn, Inc. ("Two Jinn") appeals from the district court's denial to set aside forfeiture 
and exonerate bond. 
2. Statement of the Case 
State agrees with Two Jim's General Course of Proceedings. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Two Jinn states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that the interests of 
justice did not require exoneration of the bond? 
2. Whether the district court failed to meet its statutory duties when issuance of the 
bench warrant was stayed? 
The State rephrases the issues as: 
1. Did the district court meet its statutory obligations when it issued a bench warrant 
but stayed its execution? 
2. Did the issue presented to the district court require that it exercise discretion when 
reaching its decision, and if so, did the district court abuse its discretion? 
INTRODUCTION 
Two Jinn, Inc. ("Two Jinn") argues that the district court erred in forfeiting Larry Grant 
Dana's ("Dana") bail after Dana failed to appear for two scheduled court dates. Appellant's 
Brief, p. 2. Two Jinn claims this was because the district court failed to recognize that the 
interests ofjustice did not require forfeiture in this case. Id., p. 3. Two Jinn's appeal is centered 
on two arguments: (1) whether district court abused its discretion in denying Two Jinn's motion 
to set aside forfeiture and exonerate bond, and (2) whether the district court failed to meets its 
statutory obligations by staying the execution of the bench warrant after Dana failed to appear at 
a pre-trial conference. Id. However, the issue before the district court focused on the district 
court's action of staying the execution of the bench warrant and whether that action was contrary 
to the duties imposed upon the court in Idaho Code $ 19-2927. R., p. 18. Two Jim later 
expanded the issue to include whether the district court's action constituted a breach of the bail 
bond contract. R., p. 4. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Construction and application of a statute presents a question of law over which the 
appellate courts exercise free review. State v. Shock, 133 Idaho 753, 755,992 P.2d 202, 204 (Ct. 
App. 1999); State v. Schumacher, 131 Idaho 484,485,959 P.2d 465,466 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Trial courts generally have discretion over bond forfeiture matters, and an appellate court 
reviews such decisions for an abuse of discretion. State v. Rum, 123 Idaho 1, 3, 843 P.2d 151, 
153 (1992); State v. Plant, 130 Idaho 130, 132, 937 P.2d 442,444 (Ct. App. 1997). In examining 
an exercise of discretion, an appellate court considers whether the trial court (1) correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion 
and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices, and (3) reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason. m, 123 Idaho at 3, 843 P.2d at 153. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ACTION TO STAY THE EXECUTION OF 
THE BENCH WARRANT COMPLIED WITH IDAHO CODE 19-2927 
Two Jinn asserts that Idaho Code § 19-2927 mandates strict compliance with its terms. 
To require strict compliance of Idaho Code 19-2927 would be contrary to Idaho case law and 
the inherent authority of a judge. Idaho Code § 19-2927 must be substantially complied with, and 
that is what the district court did in this case. The issuance of the bench warrant pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 19-2927 and the stay of its execution was in substantial compliance with the statute 
and a proper exercise of the district court's inherent authority to manage and control its docket. 
A. The District Court Acted Pursuant to its Inherent Authority to Stay the Execution 
of the Bench Warrant on January 23,2008. 
It is undisputed that pursuant to I.C.R. 46(a) and Idaho Code $ 19-2906, Dana was 
admitted to bail in the amount of $5,000 while awaiting court proceedings regarding a felony 
charge of Failing to Register as a Sex Offender. At the arraignment on December 7,2007, Dana 
entered a not guilty plea and was provided notice that the case was set for a pre-trial conference 
on January 23, 2008, and a jury trial on February 12, 2008. R., pp. 46-47. It is also undisputed 
that when Dana failed to appear for the pre-trial conference, the court forfeited the bail, issued a 
bench warrant, and provided Two Jinn with notice of the forfeiture and the stayed bench warrant. 
R., pp. 44-45. It is the action of the district court of staying the execution of the bench warrant 
that is in dispute. According to Two Jim, the interests of justice require the forfeiture should be 
set aside and the bond exonerated because of the district court's action. Appellant's Brief, p. 5. 
1. -lied with its Statutory Duties. 
In State v. Plant, the Court of Appeals considered the issue of whether the court met its 
statutory duties pursuant to Idaho Code 5 19-2927. State v. Plant, 130 Idaho 130, 132, 937 P.2d 
442, 444 (Ct. App. 1997). The surety in that case argued Idaho Code 5 19-2927 required the 
court to make certain findings of fact in the court minutes prior to forfeiture. Id. In its analysis, 
the court stated that the issue was not "a matter of the discretionary discharge of a properly 
forfeited bail bond," but rather the statutory duties of a court prior to forfeiting bail. Id. The 
Court of Appeals has recognized that substantial compliance satisfies the statutory requirements 
of Idaho Code 5 19-2927. State v. Vargas, 141 Idaho 485, 487, 111 P. 3d 621, 623 (Ct. App. 
2005). 
In the present case, the district court complied with the requirements of Idaho code 5 19- 
2927. Upon Dana's failure to appear, the district court issued a bench warrant, but stayed its 
execution until the next scheduled court date. R., p. 45. The statute only requires that the bench 
warrant be issued. There is nothing in the statute that requires the bench warrant also be 
executed. Furthermore, the district court has the inherent authority to stay the execution of a 
bench warrant. 
2. The District Court has Inherent Authoritv to Stay the Execution of a Bench 
Warrant. 
It is well settled that a court has the inherent authority to control its docket. The United 
States Supreme Court stated a court's power to stay proceedings, "is incidental to the power 
inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of 
time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants." Landis et al. v. North American Co., 299 
U.S. 248, 254, 57 S. Ct. 163, 166 (1936). The Idaho Supreme Court has also recognized this 
inherent authority and has stated, 
[clourts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very 
creation, with power to impose silence, respect and decorum, in their presence, 
and submission to their lawful mandates." 
Talbot v. Ames Construction, 127 Idaho 648, 651, 904 P. 2d 560, 563 (1995) citing Anderson v. 
m, 6 Wheat. 204, 227, 5 L. Ed. 242 (1821). The court went on to state, 
[tlhese powers are 'governed not by rule or statute hut by the control necessarily 
vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and 
expeditious disposition of cases.' 
Id., citing Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31, 82 S. Ct. 1386, 1388-1389, 8 L. Ed. 2d 
'h the present case, the district court was faced with a situation similar to that in State v. 
Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, 952 P.2d 1249 (Ct. App. 1998). Ji Abracadabra, the 
defendant failed to appear for an arraignment and the court had been informed the defendant was 
in custody, but had not been transported. Id., at 115, 952 P. 2d at 1251. Unlike the present case, 
the court in Abracadabra decided not to forfeit the bond and continued the arraignment to 
another day. Id. The defendant failed to appear at the continued arraignment and bond was 
forfeited and a bench warrant was issued. Id. 
The district court could have taken those same steps in the present case, which would 
have created a greater delay in the proceedings. Instead, the district court chose to forfeit the 
bond pursuant to Idaho Code 5 19-2927 when Dana failed to appear for the pre-trial conference 
on January 23, 2008, thereby providing Two Jinn with immediate notice of Dana's failure to 
appear. The district court also issued a bench warrant, but in an exercise of its inherent authority, 
stayed the execution of that bench warrant to avoid vacating the previously scheduled court date 
of February 12,2008. It would have been at that court date the district court would have had the 
opportunity to determine whether Dana had a sufficient excuse for not appearing at the pre-trial 
conference. Because Dana failed to appear on February 12, the district court was never in a 
position to make that determination. This action by the district court was performed out of its 
need to preside with judicial efficiency and economy, while ensuring justice to the parties. 
Department of Labor and Industrial Services v. East Ida110 Mills. Inc., 11 1 Idaho 137, 139, 721 
P. 2d 736,738 (Ct. App. 1986). 
Two Jinn argues that it was prejudiced by the district court's actions by limiting its ability 
to investigate this case and providing Dana more time to flee the area. Appellant's Brief, p. 5. 
Two Jinn has failed to demonstrate any actual prejudice. In the affidavit of Gina Tumer filed by 
Two Jinn in support of its Response to State's Objection to Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and 
Exonerate Bond, Two Jinn admits it received the January 23, 2008, notice of forfeiture. R., p. 9, 
L. 6. However, Tumer further states that because a warrant was not initially active, the case was 
not assigned to an investigator until February 4, 2008. Id., L. 8. The district court provided Two 
Jinn the required notice of the forfeiture and included information regarding the stayed bench 
warrant. R., p. 44. Two Jinn's decision of how and when to investigate Dana's failure to appear 
is not the fault of the district court. 
Two Jinn also argued in its Response to State's Objection to Motion to Set Aside 
Forfeiture and Exonerate Bond that had the warrant been active, "the Defendant may have been 
arrested by law enforcement for something as simple as speeding." R., p. 5 (emphasis added). In 
the affidavit of Thomas Conger filed in support of Two Jim's Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture 
and Exonerate Bond and Conditional Request for Hearing, Conger states Dana stole a vehicle 
and fled the state shortly after the January 23, 2008, court date. R., p. 22, L. 8. Conger does not 
provide the actual date as to when this occurred. Likewise, Conger fails to provide a date as to 
when it is alleged Dana had contact with law enforcement in Illinois. Id., L. 9. The only 
information in Conger's affidavit that links Dana's whereabouts to a specific date is when 
Conger received information in July 2008, that Dana was possibly in Kansas. Id., L. 10. Without 
more specific dates, it is impossible to find Two Jinn suffered prejudice by the stay of the 
execution of the bench warrant. As the district court stated at the hearing on October 3,2008, 
[i]t is not the luxury of the surety to rely upon law enforcement in a sister state to 
effect an apprehension of the defendant. It's the obligation of the surety to effect 
an apprehension of a defendant and to surrender him to the authorities of the State 
of Idaho. 
October 3,2008, Tr., p. 8, Ls. 17-23. 
Two Jinn failed to present any evidence of actual prejudice it suffered to overcome the 
district court's exercise of judicial authority in staying the bench warrant. There is nothing in the 
record to indicate that had the bench warrant not been stayed, Dana would have been located and 
taken into custody. 
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Forfeiting Dana's Bail. 
1. The District Court was not Presented with an Issue Requiring an Exercise of 
Discretion. 
Unlike a court's failure to provide notice of forfeiture within five days, a court's failure to 
issue a bench warrant does not provide the surety automatic exoneration. Idaho Code 5 19-2927. 
Even though the bench warrant was issued in this case, Two Jinn argues because the statute does 
not provide this relief in the present circumstances, the court must apply I.C.R. 46(e)(4) to the 
facts of this case. Appellant's Brief, p. 5. I.C.R. 46(e)(4) provides that "the forfeiture be set aside 
upon such conditions as the court may impose, if it appears that justice does not require the 
enforcement of forfeiture." 
Two Jinn argues that because the district court stayed the execution of the bench warrant, 
justice required the forfeiture to be set aside. Appellant's Brief, p. 5. As argued above, the 
district court's stayed execution of the bench warrant issued pursuant to Idaho Code 5 19-2927 is 
not a discretionary matter. The record indicates that at the hearing before the district court, the 
district court considered the issue before it was whether the stayed bench warrant was in 
compliance with the statutory requirements of Idaho Code 5 19-2927. During its introduction at 
the hearing, Two Jinn summarized its argument as "requesting that the notice of forfeiture be set 
aside due to the failure of the proper issuance of the arrest warrant in this matter as required by 
Idaho Code 19-2927." October 3, 2008, Tr., p. 1, Ls. 11-15. The district court recognized it was 
in compliance with the statute and concluded, "bond was forfeited, and a warrant did issue, but 
execution of the warrant was stayed. The bond is in default. The motion to exonerate will be 
denied," Id., p. 8, Ls. 24-25 and p. 9, Ls. 1-2. 
2. The District Court did not Abuse its Discretion. 
Even assuming the issue before the district court was a discretionary matter, Two Jinn 
has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion. Case law is clear that a court's 
decision to forfeit a bail bond is a discretionary decision. State v. Fry, 128 Idaho 50, 53, 910 P.2d 
164, 167 (Ct. App. 1994). Pursuant to Idaho Code 5 19-2927 and I.C.R. 46(e)(l), the district 
court forfeited Dana's bail and issued a bench warrant after he failed to appear at the pre-trial 
conference. The district court noted the failure to appear in the court minutes and issued a bench 
warrant, but stayed its execution until February 12, 2008. R., p. 45. The district court provided 
notice to Two Jinn of the forfeiture and the stayed bench warrant. R., p. 44. 
Two Jinn has not presented to the Court any excuse or reason why Dana did not appear as 
ordered, but asserts the "delay of 20 days in issuing the bench warrant interfered with the 
surety's ability to locate and surrender the Defendant." R., p. 18-19. In &, the Court of Appeals 
stated. 
[i]f no such excuse is shown, the district court then must determine how much, up 
to the entire amount of bail, is to be forfeited. This latter decision is also a 
discretionary decision, apart from, but closely related to, the original decisions 
whether a sufficient excuse has been demonstrated and whether bail should be 
forfeited. 
&, 128 Idaho at 54,910 P.2d at 168. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in forfeiting Dana's bond. Dana, who 
witllout sufficient excuse failed to appear at the pre-trial conference as ordered by the court, was 
in willful violation of the conditions of his bail. The district court was not presented with any 
excuse as to Dana's absence, nor were any of the other conditions providing for exoneration met. 
Dana was not surrendered or arrested within 180 day pursuant to Idaho Code $ 5  19-2924 and 19- 
2927, Dana's case was not dismissed which provides for exoneration under Idaho Code 5 19- 
3503' and Dana was not committed to jail after conviction as provided in Idaho Code 5 19-2319. 
At the time of the hearing on October 3, 2008, the register of actions does not show Dana had 
been arrested on the warrant. R., pp. 1-3. 
As the moving party, Two Jinn bore the burden of proving in the district court that justice 
did not require the enforcement of the forfeiture. In its brief, Two Jinn stated, 
[tlhe lower court did not indicate it perceived the request to set aside forfeiture 
and exonerate the bond as one of discretion. The lower court did not act within the 
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable 
to the specific choices before it. The lower court did not reach its decision by an 
exercise of reason. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 4. 
However, Two Jinn failed to identify what those boundaries of discretion are and the 
applicable legal standards. Two Jinn's argument has been centered upon the district court's 
action of issuing the bench warrant but staying its execution. As argued above, this is not a 
discretionary matter, but should it be determined that this was a discretionary matter, factors for 
consideration to set aside a forfeiture and exonerate bond have been identified. Those factors 
include (1) the willfulness of the violation; (2) the surety's participation in locating and 
apprehending the defendant; (3) the resulting costs, inconvenience, and prejudice suffered by the 
State; (4) any intangible costs; (5) the public's interest in ensuring a defendant's appearance; and 
(6) any mitigating factors. &, 128 Idaho a1 54,910 P. 2d at 168. Although Two Jinn decries the 
district court's abuse of discretion, the record does not indicate that Two Jinn presented any 
evidence that would have supported a finding that these factors showed any injustice in the 
forfeiture. 
Two Jinn has not established on the record before this Court that the district court abused 
its discretion by deciding that the interests of justice did not call for the forfeiture to be set aside 
due to its decision to stay the execution of the bench warrant. Justice does not require the 
forfeiture be set aside in this case where Dana failed to appear and failed to comply with the 
conditions of his bail. Justice also does not require the forfeiture be set aside in this case when 
Two Jinn alleged, but failed to establish, it was prejudiced by the district court's action to issue, 
but stay the execution of the bench warrant. 
The district court interpreted this as a matter of discretion and applied the applicable 
standards and law. The district court's decision to forfeit Dana's bond was a reasonable exercise 
of this discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court substantially complied with Idaho Code 5 19-2927 and was within its 
authority to stay the execution of Dana's bench warrant. The district court did not abuse its 
discretion by not setting aside the forfeiture. 
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order denying 
Two Jinn's motion to set aside forfeiture and exonerate bail. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of July, 2009. 
By .KL /A.I&~L- 
Karin Magnelli 
Deputy ~ k o r n e ~  General 
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